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MADDENING CHOICES: THE TENSION
BETWEEN BULLYING
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
FRANCISco M. NEGR6N, JR.*
"In that direction," the Cat said, waving its right
paw round, "lives a Hatter: and in that
direction," waving the other paw, "lives a March
Hare. Visit either you like: they're both mad."
"But I don't want to go among mad people,"
Alice remarked.
"Oh, you can't help that," said the Cat, "we're
all mad here."'
INTRODUCTION
Public schools today can empathize with the befuddled
Alice's struggle to understand the reality described by the Cheshire
Cat. Educators in today's public schools have similarly difficult
choices to make when dealing with the inherent tension between
addressing the problem of bullying and protecting the free speech
rights of students. Like Alice, the choices for school districts can be
disconcerting, if not maddening. Why? Because schools are faced
with balancing two strongly competing interests: ensuring safe
learning environments for all students and protecting student free
speech. At a time when federal courts disagree on how the tensions
should be resolved, and without such a resolution from the
Supreme Court, school leaders are left to make on-the-ground
'Francisco M. Negr6n, Jr., is General Counsel for the National School
Boards Association. He acknowledges the generous assistance of Sonja H.
Trainor, Thomas W. Burns, and Nia Davis, without whom this article would
not have been possible.
1. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 109
(Richard Kelly ed., Broadview Editions, 2d ed., 2011) (1865).
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choices that at best recognize only one interest, and at worst result
in litigation from the offended side. Sometimes this process is more
akin to juggling or choosing between two mad characters than
balancing.
Following a series of tragic teen suicides, legislatures across
the country understandably have sought to address the problem of
bullying in schools with myriad new legislation. As of this writing,
all states except Montana have anti-bullying statutes requiring
action by local schools.2 These state-level legislative efforts occur
even as an activist federal Department of Education, determined to
use the federal purse to drive its mandates to the local school level,
demands more aggressive policing and even elimination of all
incidents of bullying.3 These well-meaning efforts, however, offer
little guidance to help schools understand how the free speech
rights of students may affect anti-bullying efforts. While there
appear to be no definitive, comprehensive studies on this matter,
anecdotal reports suggest that the combination of media attention,
legislation, and an aggressive federal effort may be causing an
increase in the number of lawsuits filed.4  The matter is further
complicated by the lack of a definitive decision from the United
2. See SONJA TRAINOR, NAT'L SCH. BDS. ASS'N, SCHOOL DISTRICT
LIABILITY FOR PEER BULLYING AND HARASSMENT: FEDERAL INITIATIVES,
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINTS, AND CURRENT LEGAL STANDARDS 5 (2012) (citing
STATE ANTI-BULLYING STATUTES, NAT'L SCH. BDS. AsS'N (2012), available at
http://www.nsba.org/SchoolLaw/ssues/Safety/Table.pdf).
3. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dept.
of Educ. (Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
letters/colleague-201010.pdf.
4. According to the Oregon newspaper, The Register-Guard, there is a
rising trend in lawsuits against public schools seeking more anti-bullying
prevention. Karen McCowan, Bullying Suits Put Schools in a Bind: Districts
Being Sued by Alleged Bullying Victims as well as Accused Bullies, THE
REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), July 3,2012, at Al ("'The risk management
topic of the year is the issue of harassment, bullying and communication with
parents,' said Geoff Sinclair, Director of Claims for the Special Districts
Association of Oregon, an organization that administers Oregon school
districts' self-insurance fund for legal claims. 'Schools are often put into a very
difficult situation where, if they discipline Johnny a certain way for perceived
harassment, they're going to get sued. I think most districts are doing what
they believe is best for kids and letting the chips fall where they may."').
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
States Supreme Court that offers schools a polestar to follow as
they attempt to balance their strong interest in ensuring safe
learning environments with a similarly strong interest in protecting
the free speech rights of students. This Article explores expansive
federal agency directives and disparate findings of federal courts to
highlight the need for a polestar decision from the Supreme Court
on which schools can rely to manage and resolve these competing
values in a way that minimizes legal risk and expense.
I. THE FEDERAL EXPANSION
On October 26, 2010, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights at
the United States Department of Education, Russlynn Ali, issued a
"guidance" letter to public schools.' The so-called "Dear Colleague
Letter" set forth an expanded federal vision for the handling of
6bullying issues in public schools. The Letter sought to conflate
federal civil rights remedies and agency enforcement standards,
applying broadly the analysis of peer harassment under federal civil
rights statutes to the bullying context.7 The Letter moves beyond
the peer harassment analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,8 prescribing myriad
preventative and remedial measures to be taken by schools in a
variety of bullying contexts.9 At their cores, the Dear Colleague
Letter and the historic federal initiative on bullyinglo represent an
5. Ali, supra note 3.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999) (holding that federal funding recipients may
be held liable for damages "only where they are deliberately indifferent to
sexual harassment, of which they have actual knowledge, that is so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victim of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school").
9. See Ali, supra note 3.
10. See TRAINOR, supra note 2, at 3 ("Federal agencies, led by the
Obama Administration, are taking unprecedented action on the issue of peer
bullying and harassment. The White House launched a media campaign that
includes the 'stopbullying.gov' web site, provided numerous anti-bullying
resources, and held two White House summits on bullying. The U.S.
Department of Education has aligned several of its offices to work on the
366 [Vol. 11I
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effort to attack bullying at the place where students physically
gather -schools -building on President Obama's personal
reflections on bullying" and the national media spotlight on
bullying-related tragedies. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
Dear Colleague Letter went beyond merely urging schools to
address the problem of bullying aggressively, effectively urging a
new legal standard that would ultimately penalize schools, despite
the success of other measures, if they fell short of completely
eliminating bullying and the "hostile environment it creates.""
Critics of the federal government's missive charged that the
Dear Colleague Letter, albeit well intentioned, failed to take into
consideration the competing constitutional interests at play. For
instance, shortly after the Letter was issued, the National School
Boards Association (NSBA) 13 raised concerns over the First
perceived problem and funded research. A Federal Interagency Workgroup
on Bullying is in place, with representatives from agencies including the
Department of Education, the National Institutes of Health and associated
agencies, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration,
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the National Institute of Justice, and the Health Resources and
Services Administration.").
11. See Barack Obama, President Obama Releases Anti-bullying Message,
You TUBE (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IYOeQsLstvU
(stating he was "shocked and saddened" by suicides of young people "who
were bullied and taunted for being gay").
12. Ali, supra note 3, at 3-4 (emphasis added) ("A school's responsibility
is to eliminate the hostile environment created by the harassment, address its
effects, and take steps to ensure that harassment does not recur." (emphasis
added)); id. at 2-3 ("If an investigation reveals that discriminatory harassment
has occurred, a school must take prompt and effective steps reasonably
calculated to end the harassment, eliminate any hostile environment and its
effects, and prevent the harassment from recurring." (emphasis added)).
13. Founded in 1940, the National School Boards Association (NSBA) is
a not-for-profit organization whose mission is to advocate for equity and
excellence in public education through school board leadership. About the
National School Board Association (NSBA), NSBA,
http://www.nsba.org/About (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). NSBA and its member
state associations of school boards represent more than 90,000 local school
board members, governing 13,809 local school districts serving the nation's 50
million public school students. Id.
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Amendment implications of the federal government's new charge.14
Specifically, NSBA warned the U.S. Department of Education that
regulating student speech, even bullying speech, presented
difficulties for schools, which "have a limited ability to discipline
students for [protected] speech that occurs on-campus and off-
campus."' 5 NSBA pointed out that even harassing speech might
not be categorically denied First Amendment protection1 6 unless it
is materially disruptive or infringes on the rights of others," is
patently offensive,' 8 is subject to curricular control," or encourages
20illegal drug use.
NSBA also expressed concern about the Letter's suggestion
that schools could regulate "bullying and harassment that takes
place over the internet or through other electronic communication
[that] often occurs entirely off-campus." 21 NSBA pointed out that
the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the question; neither the
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Distric,22
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,23 and Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier24 trilogy, nor the Morse v. Frederick25 decision
contemplated the regulation of off-campus speech expressly.26
Notwithstanding the constitutional challenges of regulating
off-campus speech, the actual, on-the-ground realities have school
officials often decrying what many perceive as an untenable goal.
14. Letter from Francisco Negr6n, Gen. Counsel Nat'l Sch. Bd. Ass'n, to
Charlie Rose, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Dec. 7, 2010), available at
http://www.nsba.org/SchoolLaw/ssues/Safety/NSBA-letter-to-Ed-12-07-
10.pdf.
15. Id. at 6.
16. Id.
17. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969).
18. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986).
19. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
20. Morse v. Frederick,551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
21. Negr6n, supra note 14, at7.
22. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
23. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
24. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
25. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
26. Negr6n,supra note 14, at6.
[Vol 11I368
Oregon School Boards Association Attorney Morgan Smith
explains:
It [is] difficult for schools to draw a line
between what is something affecting kids at
school and what is off-campus conduct by
individual students. Schools can only really
take care of what happens inside the
schoolhouse. They can't really police what
happens at the mall on the weekend or in
cyberspace at night.27
Two cases out of the Third Circuit make painfully clear the perils of
school officials attempting to regulate off-campus online student
speech. In those cases, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, sitting en banc, invalidated two school districts' disciplinary
action against students for cyber speech occurring off campus-
specifically, online parody profiles of the students' principals posted
28to the social networking site MySpace. In Layshock v. Hermitage
School District,29 the Third Circuit rejected the school district's
attempt to identify a "nexus" to the school and the applicability of
the line of decided cases cited by the school district supporting its
asserted authority to reach beyond the physical boundaries of the
school to regulate student speech.3 0 Those decisions,' said the
court, "stand for nothing more than the rather unremarkable
proposition that schools may punish expressive conduct that occurs
outside of school, as if it occurred inside the 'schoolhouse gate,'
under certain very limited circumstances, none of which are present
here.", 2 In the court's opinion, those "limited circumstances" were
27. McCowan, supra note 4.
28. See Layshock v. Hernitage Sch. Dist., 650 F3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); J.S. v. Blue Mountain
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, U.S. __ 132
S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
29. 650 F.3d205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
30. See id. at 216-17.
31. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of
Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F2d 34 (2d Cir. 2007); J.S. v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 801 A2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
32. Layshock,650 F3d at 219.
3692013] MADDENING CHOICES
FIRST A MENDMENT LA W REVIEW
not present in Layshock given the admitted lack of material
disruption of the educational setting and an attenuated connection
to the school.33 Similarly, in 1.S. v. Blue Mountain School District,34
the Third Circuit applied Tinker to reject the school district's
assertion that it could regulate a student's off-campus, online
parody of a principal because, inter alia, there was "no dispute that
J.S.'s speech did not cause a substantial disruption in the school.'35
Neither was it reasonably foreseeable, held the court, that the
profile would create a disruption, as "[t]he profile was so
outrageous that no one could have taken it seriously, and no one
did," 6 and J.S. took steps to limit access to the profile.37
II. BETWIXT AND BETWEEN THE MAD HATTER AND THE MARCH
HARE: THE COURT DECISIONS
A. Ensuring a Safe Learning Environment
Public school leaders have long understood the importance
of a safe learning environment This imperative at times drives
schools to regulate speech in ways that run head long into the First
Amendment" The Supreme Court's seminal decision in the
33. Id.
34. 650 F.3d915 (3d Cir.2011) (en banc).
35. Id. at 928.
36. Id. at 930.
37. Id.
38. In an effort to help schools navigate these competing interests while
avoiding the potential legal fray, the Religious Freedom Education Project of
the First Amendment Center led an effort by the American Jewish
Committee, joined by the National School Boards Association and "broad
coalitions of educators and religious groups," to publish instructional
guidelines for schools. See RELIGIOUS FREEDOM EDUCATION PROJECT,
HARASSMENT, BULLYING AND FREE EXPRESSION: GUIDELINES FOR FREE AND
SAFE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2012),
http://www.nsba.org/SchoolLaw/Issues/Equity/Harassment-Bullying-and-Free-
Expression-Guidelines-for-Free-and-Safe-Public-Schools.pdf. The publication
seeks to "fill a need the judicial system has not" by distinguishing between
speech as a weapon and speech as the expression of an idea. Lauren Markoe,




student speech arena, Tinker, occurred in just this context School
officials, afraid of the disruption that might be caused by middle
and high school students wearing black armbands in protest of the
Vietnam conflict, suspended students who refused to remove
them.39  The Court, noting that "undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to
freedom of expression,"4 0 laid out the test that school officials
would use for decades to come. 4 1 To restrict otherwise protected
student speech, school officials would have to have reason to
anticipate that the speech would "materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school," or "impinge upon the rights of other
students."42 These two prongs of the standard have become known,
respectively, as Tinker's substantial disruption and rights of others
prongs.
Since 1969, courts across the United States have applied the
Tinker decision, each time essentially reassessing the appropriate
balancing point between school officials' safety concerns and
students' free speech rights.4 3 On the safety side of the equation,
some courts have been sympathetic to a school's interest in
regulating "derogatory and injurious remarks" that have the power
to psychologically attack students in order to ensure student
security.4 4  For instance, in Harper v. Poway Unified School
between-free-speech-bullying/2012/05/22/gIQAropmiU-story.html. In doing
so, the publication offers educators non-legal guidance on avoiding a potential
constitutional crisis through teachable moments in which aggressive speech is
addressed through the lens of respectful discourse in a democratic society.
39. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504
(1969).
40. Id. at 508.
41. See id. at 509.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F3d 109 (2d Cir. 2012);
S.J.W. v. Lee's Summit Sch. Dist. R-7, 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012); Kowalski
v. Berkeley Cnty Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); Zamecnik v. Indian
Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874 (7th Gr. 2011); Defoe ex rel. Defoe v.
Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 801
A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
44. See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist, 445 F.3d 1166,1183 (9th
Cir. 2006), judgment vacated, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
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District,4 5 a student wore a t-shirt with the phrases: "I will not
accept what God has condemned" and "homosexuality is shameful
'Romans 1:27."'46 The student wore the shirt in response to
observation at school of a "Day of Silence" by which the school's
Gay-Straight Alliance intended to promote tolerance. Upon
wearing a similar shirt the next day, the student was placed in the
school principal's office for the entire school day after refusing to
remove the shirt, which school officials labeled as inflammatory and
contributing to a hostile environment. After a federal district court
denied the student's motion for preliminary injunction, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school, relying on the
rarely-cited "rights of other students" prong of the Tinker
decision.4 7  "We conclude," said the majority, the student's
"wearing of his t-shirt 'colli[des] with the rights of other students' in
the most fundamental way."48 The majority found that "[b]eing
secure involves not only freedom from physical assaults but from
psychological attacks that cause young people to question their self-
worth and their rightful place in society." 49 The court narrowed its
ruling specifically to harmful remarks that target a student's
50protected status such as race, religion, or sexual orientation.
In dissent, Judge Alex Kozinski, finding nothing plainly
offensive about the language of the student's shirt, argued that the
school district had failed to provide enough evidence of disruption
or a reasonable forecast thereof under the Tinker analysis to
support its actions.' (This is not dissimilar to the Third Circuit's
approach in Layshock and Blue Mountain,52 even though these
45. 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006).
46. Id. at 1171 (capitalization removed).
47. Id. at 1177.
48. Id. at 1178 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,393
U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
49. Id. at 1178.
50. Id. at 1183.
51. Id. at 1193-94 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
52. Layschock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F3d 205, 217 (3d Gr. 2011)
(en banc), cert. denied, __ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) ("The District rests
this argument primarily on three cases which it claims allow it to respond to a
student's vulgar speech when that speech is posted on the internet . ...
However, as we will explain, each of those cases involved off campus
372 FIRST A MENDMEN T LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 11
cases involved off-campus speech). Judge Kozinski noted that the
only record evidence of disruption of educational activities was
some lack of focus by some students in the classroom.s3 The
54majority, however, reminded the dissent of Tinker's second prong.
It noted the tension between students' individual rights and the
right to a safe educational environment, and held that the school's
regulation of speech here (requiring the student to remain in the
principal's office after he refused to remove the shirt) was "no more
than necessary to prevent the intrusion on the rights of other
students," as the student was not disciplined further.
This tension between the recognized goal of creating a safe
educational environment free of harassment and the, albeit limited,
free speech rights of students is addressed, though not overtly, in
case after case. Indeed, the tension highlights a rising rift between
courts upholding school regulation of student speech premised on
Tinker's substantial disruption standard (very common), or the
rights of others prong (less common). Like the Ninth Circuit in
Harper, some jurists are willing to extend Tinker's rights of others
prong by linking it to more recent Supreme Court precedent that
expressive conduct that resulted in a substantial disruption of the school, and
the courts allowed the schools to respond to the substantial disruption that the
student's out of school conduct caused."); J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650
F.3d 915, 932 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cen. denied, _ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct.
1097 (2012) ("Thus, under the Supreme Court's precedent, the Fraser
exception to Tinker does not apply here. In other words, Fraser's lewdness
standard cannot be extended to justify a school's punishment of J.S. for use of
profane language outside the school, during non-school hours.").
53. Harper,445 F.3d at 1193-94 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (Teacher David
"LeMaster gives no indication that the distracted students refused to get back
on task once they were admonished, or that the t-shirt caused a commotion or
otherwise materially interfered with class activities. As this is the only
evidence that Harper's t-shirt interfered with classroom learning, I find it
ludicrously weak support for banning Harper's t-shirt on the ground that it
would 'materially disrupt[ I classwork."').
54. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178-82 (majority opinion). In fact, this is one of
a very few decided cases to mention, much less apply, Tinker's second prong.
See Francisco M. Negr6n, Jr., A Foot in the Door? The Unwitting Move
Towards A "New" Student Welfare Standard in Student Speech After Morse v.
Frederick, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1221, 1228-32 (2009).
55. Harper,445 F3d at 1183.
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appears to establish a "student welfare standard" for the regulation
56 5of student speech. In Defoe v. Spiva,5 7 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit ruled that a school district's ban on displays of
the Confederate flag in a school did not violate a student's free
58speech rights. Although the decision was unanimous, one judge
wrote separately to announce reliance on Morse v. Frederick59
That judge wrote that Morse recognized an "'important, perhaps
compelling interest" in deterring drug use in the schools, [and that]
there is of course a comparably 'important, perhaps compelling'
interest in reducing racial tension in the public schools." 60
The idea that schools have a role in limiting student speech
in the interest of the students' welfare appears in school district
policies, particularly in the bullying arena. Some courts
interpreting such policies come down clearly on the side of
protecting pure religious or political speech, asserting that even if it
is offensive to some, school regulation of speech in what amounts to
the "culture wars" is ultimately an impermissible chilling of
students' rights to express a sincerely held belief.61 But other courts
are less willing to view school regulation in this manner. In
Morrison v. Board of Education of Boyd County,62 for instance, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed a federal district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of a school district whose policy barred
"stigmatizing or insulting comments regarding another student's
sexual orientation."63 In that case, a student sought a preliminary
injunction against the school district, asserting that although the
student never violated the policy and was never disciplined under it,
56. For a comprehensive treatment of the rising "student welfare
standard," see generally Negr6n, supra note 54.
57. 625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010).
58. Id. at 337.
59. Id. at 339 (Rogers, J., concurring) (relying on Morse v. Frederick,551
U.S. 393 (2007)).
60. Id. at 340 (Roger, J. concurring).
61. See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204,636 F3d 874 (7th
Cir. 2011); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001). See
also McGlone v. Bell, 681 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that chilled speech
is a constitutional free speech violation).
62. 521 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2008).
63. Id. at 605.
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the policy violated his First Amendment rights.64 He claimed that
his sincerely held belief that homosexuality is a sin compelled him
as a Christian to share that belief and tell people when they are
sinning.65 The student also challenged the school district's practice
implementing the policy in which school officials allegedly
explained in training sessions that having a sincerely held belief
66does not grant the right to express it to others who disagree. In
the end, the court sidestepped much substantive reasoning by
finding that the student lacked standing, as he had shown no
demonstrable injury-in-fact or redressability for the chilled
67speech. One judge dissented, however, in an opinion reminiscent
of Judge Posner's decision in Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie School
District No. 204,6 asserting that a chill on an individual's ability to
exercise free speech is a constitutional injury-in-fact, especially
69where, as here, there is a rule specifically proscriptive of speech.
School officials, government agencies, parents, and students
increasingly expect schools to create completely safe and
harassment-free learning environments. Schools are feeling
growing demands to police bullying behavior more aggressively.
When schools proceed less aggressively, or when parents deem
their actions insufficient, particularly where tragic suicides are
involved, litigation ensues.7 Because so many of these cases are
brought in federal courts, alleging federal civil rights and
constitutional violations, the economic stakes for school districts




67. Id. at 611.
68. 636 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 2011). See discussion of Zamecnik, infra notes
79-88 and accompanying text.
69. Morrison, 521 F3d at 617-18 (Moore, J., dissenting).
70. For a survey of fourteen recent lawsuits in federal court alleging
school inaction or indifference in bullying or harassment cases see, TRAINOR,
supra note 2, at 12.
71. Id. ("Because there is no established 'bullying' cause of action,
plaintiffs tend to plead a variety of claims. As the chart indicates, the most
common causes of action are those based on state law, with most complaints
alleging some form of negligence or failure to supervise or train staff. Federal
3752013] MADDENING CHOICES
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committed suicide after being harassed and bullied by classmates
for several years, filed a wrongful death lawsuit in an Indiana
district court alleging the student's high school's responses to
harassment led to the teen's suicide.72 The suit claimed the student
was "subjected to relentless harassment, ridicule and bullying" over
the course of several years because of his ethnicity and sexual
orientation.7 3 In another instance, a federal district court in Texas
granted a school district's motion for reconsideration in a similar
suit brought by a parent7 4 The court dismissed the parent's § 1983
due process claim alleging that the school's failure to enforce anti-
bullying policies contributed to the student's suicide.
Interestingly, the Indiana suit alleges that the student "'had
a right to be free from sexual harassment and discrimination based
on sexual orientation while in any educational program or activity
that receives federal financial assistance,"' and that the school knew
about the harassment, but failed to do anything to stem it.76 The
suit, which seeks compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys'
fees, and other associated costs, strongly echoes the Dear Colleague
Letter, in which the U. S. Department of Education warned schools
about failing to eliminate harassment, or to respond to a bullying
situation about which the school knew or should have known.7 7
suits nearly always allege a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process or Equal Protection Clauses, as these concepts tend to encompass a
broader range of conduct than specific civil rights statutes.").
72. See Brent Brown, Lucas suit seeks compensation, damages, Claims
GCS and faculty at fault for death, GREENSBURG DAILY NEwS (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://greensburgdailynews.com/local/x1059009573/Lucas-suit-seeks-
compensation-damages. See also WiG, Mother of gay suicide victim files
wrongful death suit, WISC. GAZETTE (Sept. 10, 2012),
http://www.wisconsingazette.com/breaking-news/mother-of-gay-suicide-
victim-files-wrongful-death-suit.html.
73. See WiG, supra note 72.
74. See Estate of Brown v. Cypress Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 863 F.
Supp. 2d 632 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
75. Id. at 639.
76. WiG,supra note 72.
77. See Ali, supra note 3, at 2 ("A school is responsible for addressing
harassment incidents about which it knows or reasonably should have
known.").
376 [Vol. 11I
B. Protecting Free Speech
Not all courts agree, however, that the school's right to
regulate speech is boundless even if it involves harassing or bullying
speech that contributes to a "hostile environment" Indeed, courts
differ about what constitutes harassing speech.8 Some speech,
offensive though it may be to some, expresses a sincerely held
belief. When a sincerely held belief is at play, the First Amendment
scales tip against regulation, absent some other indicators that the
speech will be disruptive or infringes on the rights of others, 6i la
Tinker. Phrases on t-shirts, such as "Homosexuality is a Sin"
followed by a Bible verse, or "I Believe in Traditional Marriage,"
may be just such expressions.
In Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie School District Number 204,
for instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
found that students were entitled to a permanent injunction barring
a school district from banning "Be Happy, Not Gay" t-shirts. 9
Writing for the three-judge panel, Judge Richard Posner found that
absent evidence of a Tinker-like substantial disruption, the school
could not ban the wearing of the t-shirts.so In essence, the court
found that the doctrine of the "heckler's veto" applied to enjoin the
school from enforcing its ban, as the speech could not be construed
as fighting words.8'
78. See Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding ban on
clothing depicting Confederate flag, concluding that school reasonably
forecast substantial and material disruption of school environment); see also
Castorina v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2001) (allowing
students to continue to wear t-shirts depicting country music star Hank
Williams, Jr. and two images of the Confederate flag with the phrase
"Southern Thunder" on the back until court determined: (1) whether the
school board had enforced the dress code in an unfair and discriminatory
manner, and consequently, if the speech was protected under the rules
governing schools' authority to regulate student speech, and (2) if wearing the
t-shirt created a likelihood of violence or other disruption).
79. Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874,875 (7th
Cir. 2011). The district court denied the students' motion for a preliminary
injunction, but the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded to the district
court. Id.
80. Id. at 879-80.
81. Id. at 879.
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The Seventh Circuit rejected the school's claim that the
slogan "Be Happy, Not Gay" was "particularly insidious," and
rejected the claim of disruption.82 Specifically, the court found that
"the fact that homosexual students and their sympathizers harassed
[one of the plaintiff students] because of their disapproval of her
message is not a permissible ground for banning it."83 Significantly,
Judge Posner recognized that while schools have a role in
protecting students, they cannot go so far as to ban student speech
merely because it hurts some students' feelings. As a rule, he said,
there is no "generalized 'hurt feelings' defense to a high school's
violation of the First Amendment rights of its students."84 But,
Judge Posner's perspective about where the line is drawn is more
than a mere dismissive refusal to inject the federal courts into the
midst of adolescent tit-for-tats. Rather, Judge Posner casted the
speech at issue here as almost purely political, albeit "tepidly
negative,"ss arguing that "school[s] that permit[] advocacy of the
rights of homosexual students cannot be allowed to stifle criticism
of homosexuality." Judge Posner rejected the school's argument
"that banning 'Be Happy, Not Gay' was just a matter of protecting
the 'rights' of the students against whom derogatory comments are
directed," opting instead for the notion that "people in our society
do not have a legal right to prevent criticism of their beliefs or even
their way of life."87 Judge Posner clearly believed the t-shirt was a
form of a political speech: "Although tolerance of homosexuality
82. Id. at 881 ("The second type of evidence was barred by the doctrine,
unmentioned by the school, of the "heckler's veto." Statements that while not
fighting words are met by violence or threats or other unprivileged retaliatory
conduct by persons offended by them cannot lawfully be suppressed because
of that conduct.") (internal citations omitted).
83. Id. at 879.
84. Id. at 877. See also, Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200,
206 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[T]here is also no question that the free speech clause
protects a wide variety of speech that listeners may consider deeply offensive,
including statements that impugn another's race or national origin or that
denigrate religious beliefs.").
85. Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 876.
86. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394 (1992); Boosv.
Barry,485 U.S. 312,321 (1988)).
87. Id.
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has grown, gay marriage remains highly controversial. Today's high
school students may soon find themselves, as voters, asked to vote
on whether to approve gay marriage, or to vote for candidates who
approve of it, or ones who disapprove." 8
Other courts, too, appear to look askance at the notion that
offensive speech-even speech that may be harassing-can be
banned or regulated. This is particularly so where the speech has
political import. In Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School
District," a federal district court allowed students to bring a claim
based on alleged violations of the First Amendment, the Due
Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause, where the
students contended their principal forbid them from wearing
American flag t-shirts.90 According to the students, the school
banned the shirts because the students wore them on Cinco de
Mayo, a day observed by some in the United States as a celebration
of Mexican-American heritage.9' School administrators were
apparently relying on a school district policy which provided that
"[c]lothing ... or actions which ... disrupt school activities will not
be tolerated. Such actions or the wearing and/or possession of these
items may be cause for suspension." 92 Reportedly, other students at
the school were wearing the colors of the Mexican flag to school on
the same day as the student plaintiffs, but were not asked to remove
their clothing. The court eventually granted the school district's
motion for summary judgment, finding that school officials
reasonably forecast that the t-shirts could cause a substantial
disruption with school activities, as at least two different students
reported the students were concerned that the clothing would lead
to violence. 9
88. Id.
89. 822 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch.
Dist., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (2011) (No. CV1O-02745 JW).
93. Dariano, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
94. Id. at 1045.
3792013] MADDENING CHOICES
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
III. No POLESTAR FROM THE SUPREME COURT
Despite the mixed messages from federal courts, there has
yet to be a definitive, Supreme Court decision to help schools
navigate the tension between the student speech issues and the
increasing national demands for safe learning environments. The
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in three student internet
speech cases, J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, as combined
with Layshock v. Hermitage School District, and Kowalksi v.
Berkeley County Schools,' disappointed education law watchers,
who had hoped the High Court would clarify how schools should
balance these competing interests.9 6
For public schools the quandary is difficult: Regulate
potentially harassing messages expressing sincerely held religious or
political beliefs and risk a private suit and its attendant costs for
violating a student's constitutional rights, or risk federal
enforcement action that threatens federal funding for contributing
to a hostile environment? The answer may lie in which Tinker
prong the High Court ultimately finds applicable in these cases, and
what it decides infringement of the rights of others ultimately
means. Morse's student welfare standard may have something to
offer in this regard.97 Still, more questions remain. The Court will
have to wrestle with whether the infringement standard is applied
individually or more expansively, perhaps, in the "hostile
environment" scenario.
The matter is further complicated by the ubiquitous
electronic forum to which students have broad access. Bullying and
harassment can at times take place entirely off-campus, over the
95. 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, __ U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1095
(Jan. 17, 2012).
96. Allan G. Osborne, Jr. & Charles J. Russo, Can Students Be
Disciplined for Oft-Campus Cyberspeech?: The Reach of the First Amendment
in the Age of Technology, 2012 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 331, 367 ("Unfortunately,
since the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Layshock, J.S., and Kowalski, it
appears that the Court will not be providing clarity to this complex issue in the
next term.").
97. See generally Negr6n, supra note 54.
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Internet, or through other electronic communication." Disciplining
students for speech is even more difficult when the speech occurs
off campus. Significantly, none of the Supreme Court cases
discussing disciplining students for speech contemplate whether
school districts can discipline students for off-campus speech. And,
in the brave new world of social networking, linking speech that
occurs in cyberspace to disruption in school poses factual problems
not contemplated by the Tinker Court. Unfortunately, to date, the
federal courts have provided little consistent guidance to help
schools determine the line between harassing speech and student
free speech, particularly in cyberspace.99
And, the Supreme Court's recent denial of certiorari in
some student cyber-speech cases suggests it is not yet ready to
resolve existing circuit conflicts. 00  Until then, schools will have
little choice but to navigate carefully the path set out by the
Cheshire Cat between the Mad Hatter and the March Hare.
98. Research by Amanda Lenhart at the Pew Research Center's Intemet
& American Life Project indicates that most teens think bullying and
harassment happens more offline than online. See Amanda Lenhart,
Cyberbullying 2010: What the Research Tells Us, PEW INTERNET (May 6,2010),
http://www.pewinternet.org/Presentations/2010/May/Cyberbullying-2010.aspx.
See also Francisco Negr6n, For Schools, Bullying Can Raise a Complex
Constitutional Problem, 2 WAKEFOREST L. REV. ONLINE 14,29 (2012).
99. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F3d 915,
931 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying Tinker to find that the school district failed to
demonstrate reasonable forecast of substantial disruption), cert. denied, _
U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F3d
205,214-15 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that school had not shown sufficient nexus
between online speech and the school), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct.
1097 (2012); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011)
(relying on the "nexus" of the student's speech to the school), cert. denied,_
U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012). Wisniewski v. Bd. of Ed. of the Weedsport
Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying Tinker's substantial
disruption test to off-campus speech that was "reasonably foreseeable" to
come on-campus).
100. See McGlone v. Bell, 681 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding chilled
speech is equal to a constitutional free speech violation); Zamecnik v. Indian
Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F3d 874 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Saxe v. State
Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
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